Newly uncovered documents seized by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in Gaza during the ongoing war with Hamas shed light on the extensive preparations the militant group undertook leading up to the October 7 attack. These documents, some of which were used in internal intelligence investigations by the IDF’s Military Intelligence Directorate and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), provide a detailed account of the communications between Hamas’ leadership in Gaza, its overseas branches, and Hezbollah and Iran.

According to intelligence analyses, as early as 2021, Hamas intensified its outreach to Iran, seeking financial and strategic support for a large-scale offensive aimed at delivering what it described as a decisive blow to Israel. In the two years preceding the war, discussions among members of the so-called “radical axis” revolved around orchestrating a coordinated multi-front assault. While this plan ultimately did not materialize in full, Hamas’ attack on October 7 caught Israeli intelligence off guard, highlighting a severe lapse in threat assessment.

Excerpt from Hamas document titled “The Movement’s Strategy 2013-2017,” undated. (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center)

Last week, a comprehensive analysis of these captured documents was published by the Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, a research institute working closely with Israel’s intelligence community. The report was authored by Dr. Uri Rost, a researcher and lecturer at Sapir College.

Rost’s findings suggest that since its founding in 1987, Hamas has consistently viewed Israel’s existence as illegitimate. However, until recent years, the group saw Israel’s destruction as a long-term objective rather than an immediate goal. Following the 2021 Guardian of the Walls operation, Hamas leadership began to believe that Israel’s downfall was within reach, marking a significant shift in strategy. This shift was evident in both public statements by Hamas officials and private communications documented in the seized files.

Image credit: www.internationalaffairs.org.au

One of the most striking revelations in the documents is Hamas’ coordination with Iran and Hezbollah. The group’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, reportedly considered Israel’s destruction a viable short-term goal, reinforced by the belief that Israel was strategically weak. This perspective was echoed in secret exchanges between Hamas and its allies, including Iranian and Hezbollah officials, who debated the feasibility of a full-scale regional war.

Iran and Hezbollah’s Role in the Planning

The documents confirm that Hamas’ leadership held extensive discussions with Iranian and Hezbollah officials regarding a coordinated attack on Israel. In June 2021, senior Hamas officials sent a letter to Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, requesting $500 million in funding over two years to prepare for what they termed a “liberation war” against Israel. The letter, which was also addressed to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, stated that Israel was weaker than perceived and could be eradicated with sufficient external support.

By July 2022, Hamas’ external leadership in Qatar intensified coordination efforts. Sinwar reportedly sent an urgent letter to Hamas’ political chief Ismail Haniyeh, urging him to travel to Iran to advance plans for a military buildup in southern Lebanon. Later, in a secret meeting with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Hamas leaders presented three potential attack scenarios. The preferred strategy was a joint assault by Hamas and Hezbollah, ideally launched during Jewish holidays when tensions in Jerusalem were typically high.

The documents align with public statements made by Hamas and its allies in the years leading up to the October 7 onslaught. In a September 2021 conference in Gaza titled “Promise of the Hereafter – Post-Liberation Palestine,” Palestinian factions openly discussed their plan for ruling all of Israel’s territory “from the river to the sea.” Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah echoed similar sentiments in May 2023, claiming that Israel’s home front was “weak, fragile, anxious, always ready to pack up and leave.”

In mid-2023, a Hamas delegation, led by Haniyeh and senior commander Saleh al-Arouri, visited Iran to discuss military coordination. Iranian officials reportedly expressed their view that the “removal of Israel from the map” was now a tangible possibility. Leading up to October 7, Hamas continued to refine its strategy. In April 2023, Sinwar told Hamas political bureau member Muhammad Nasser that the previous conflicts with Israel had been “a walk in the park” compared to the planned attack, which would “shatter the enemy into fragments.”

Rost’s analysis concludes that the October 7 assault was not merely an isolated terror operation but the culmination of years of planning based on a fundamental shift in Hamas’ strategic thinking. The group, along with its Iranian and Hezbollah backers, increasingly viewed Israel’s destruction as a realistic goal rather than distant rhetoric. However, the heavy losses Hamas has suffered in the ensuing Israeli counteroffensive may have forced it to reassess this ambition – for now.

As of early 2025, the IDF has continued its military campaign against Hamas in Gaza. However, reports suggest that Hamas is rebuilding, with over 25,000 Hamas fighters and 5,000 from Palestinian Islamic Jihad still armed. The ceasefire that had temporarily halted hostilities ended, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed a forceful response to Hamas’s refusal to release Israeli hostages.

Main article image: Gaza, October 7. Hani Alshaer/Anadolu Agency via Reuters Conne